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WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY 
Washington 
To WRA S t a f f  Members: 
The f i r s t  r epor t  i n  t h i s  s e r i e s  was a paper issued 
from t h e  Reports Division i n  October 1942, e n t i t l e d ,  Dealing 
wi th  Japanese A m e r i c a n s .  
I n  t h a t  repor t  sorne background f a c t s  of Japanese race  
and cu l t u r e  were discussed with special reference t o  r e loca t i on  
cen te r  conditions of l i f e .  
This second r epo r t  on t h e  causes of s o c i a l  un re s t  a t  
r e loca t ion  cen te rs  was o r i g i n a l l y  prepared as a  memorandum t o  
t h e  Director of t he  WAR Relocation Authority i n  December 1942. 
It w a s  revised t o  i t s  present form i n  January 1943 and i s  now 
being s e n t  out  t o  a l l  p ro jec t  personnel a t  t he  suggestion of 
s eve ra l  p ro jec t  d i r ec to r s  a t  t h e  recent  meetings i n  San Francis- 
co, Denver, and L i t t l e  Rock, 
                                                                                Sirector  
Attachment ' , 1: 
W A R  RELOCATION AUTHORITY 
Community Analysis Section 
Community Analysis Report No. 2 
by John F, Embree 
CAUSES OF UNREST AT RELOCATION CENTERS 
The inc iden ts  of l a s t  November and December a t  Poston and Manzanar 
brought i n t o  sharper focus a number of problems i n  soc i a l  r e l a t i ons  and 
adminis t ra t ion a t  t he  project l eve l .  I n  par t i cu la r ,  these incidents 
have demonstrated a need f o r  a l l  WRA personnel t o  look more ca r e fu l l y  
i n t o  t h e  underlying cause's of such flare-ups, 
There a r e  a number of f ac to r s inherent  i n  t h e  conditions of 
center  l i f e  which may create  d i f f i c u l t i e s  regardless  of how wel l  t h e  
cen te rs  a r e  administered. A recognit ion of these  f ac to r s  inherent  i n  
t he  s i t u a t i o n  may be of value because sucb a recognit ion may help ad- 
min i s t r a to r s  t o  understand c r i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n s  as  they a r i se ,  or  before  
they a r i s e ,  and t o  deal  more in te l l igent ly  with them. 
Factors Inherent  i n  t h e  S i t ua t i on  
1. A mass evacuation of people on t h e  bas i s  of japanese  ancestry, re- 
ga rd less  of l eng th  of residence, c i t i zensh ip ,  or  pas t  individual  behavior, 
has c rea ted  i n  many evacuees a sense of disi l lusionment o r  even b i t t e r -  
ness  in regard t o  A m e r i c a n  democracy. WRA personnel being the  only 
government representa t ives  with whom most evacuees now come i n  contact ,  
it i s  t h i s  personnel t h a t  bears t he  brunt of evacuee c r i t i c i sm  and re-  
sentment. 
2. Another e f f e c t  or  re locat ion has been t o  c rea te  feel ings  of extreme 
s o c i a l  and f i n a n c i a l  insecur i ty  as  t o  the  fu ture .  This may r e s u l t  i n  
a reluctance t o  leave centers  f o r  outs ide  employment, Anxieties asso- 
c i a t e d  with t h i s  f ee l i ng  of i n secu r i t y  form a f e r t i l e  f i e l d  f o r  alarmist 
rumors, 
3. The throwing together on t h e  ba s i s  of r a c i a l  l i n e s  of a group of 
people made up of a wide range of i n t e r e s t s ,  educational  background, and 
s o c i a l  c l a s s  has caused many unfortunate s i t u a t i o n s  such as  pu t t ing  
people with l i t t l e  i n  common together as  neighbors in the  same block, 
Nisei  who were becoming Americanized in C a l i f o r n i a  a r e  now subjected t o  
s t rong  Japanese influences. A r a c i a l  s o l i d a r i t y  vis-a-vis the  Caucasian 
administrat ive s t a f f  i s  another inev i tab le  r e s u l t  of center l i f e .  
4. Experiences i n  assembly  centers.  Most r es iden ts  i n  re loca t ion  centers  
spent weeks and even months i n  assembly cen te rs  before f i n a l l y  moving 
t o  t h e i r  p r e s e n t  "homes". This long ?uncertain wai t i ng  period, during 
which they  had l i t t l e  o p p o r t u n i t y  o r  incent ive  f o r  reorganizing commu- 
n i t y  l i f e  has had a demorilizing e f f e c t  on the individual ,  and a dis-  - 
organizing e f f e c t  on t r a d i t i o n d  f o r m s  of community l i f e  and s o c i a l  
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control ,  (  I t  should be remembered t h a t  evacuees i n  some assembly cen te rs  
were subjected t o  many a f f ron ts  t o  t h e i r  se l f - respect  - government 
people entered t h e i r  homes without permission; informers and government 
agents made everyone's l i f e  uncer ta in;  one could  talk  t o  a v i s i t i n g  
f r i e n d  only f o r  a shor t  time and with a guard present. The psychological 
shock of being housed i n  s t ab l e s  i s  s t i l l  f a r  from overcome, 
5 ,  Physical  conditions of l i f e  i n  t he  cen te rs  have a l so  contributed t o  
s o c i a l  disorganization.  Eating i n  common mess h a l l s  has had t he  e f f e c t  
of weakening family s o l i d a r i t y  and paren ta l  author i ty .  The weakening 
of pa r en t a l  author i ty ,  i n  turn,  has made it more d i f f i c u l t  f o r  law- 
abiding parents t o  r e s t r a i n  the  a c t i v i t i e s  of young men who may form 
gangs which can e a s i l y  d r i f t  from anti-project  administrat ion  t o  ant i -  
American in a t t i t ude .  
The lack  of privacy a n d  overcrowding wi thin  the  b a r a c k s  has a 
demoralizing e f f e c t  on many evacuees - again espec ia l ly  t h e  younger 
generation,  Added t o  t h i s  i s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  l a t r i n e s  and showers a r e  
separa te  from t h e  barracks and there  i s  a l ack  of privacy therein.  To 
a Japanese t he  l ack  of a deep bath  i s  a g r ea t  pr ivat ion,  
T h e s e  l i v i n g  conditions a r e  s imi l a r  i n  some respects  t o  those of 
slums and we may expect soc i a l  phenomena similar t o  those found i n  slums 
t o  appear - gangs, anti-police a t t i t u d e s ,  and delinquency. The l a c k  of 
adequate rec rea t ion  f a c i l i t i e s  i s  a l s o  a f a c t o r  in t h i s  s i tua t ion .  
6. Conditions of s ecu r i t y  controls.  Armed guards, barbed wire fences, 
sea rch l igh t s ,  v i s i t s  of government agents, a l l  engender t h e  f ee l i ng  of 
being i n  a concentrat ion camp. To expect people t o  be recept ive  t o  l ec -  
t u r e s  on democracy and freedom under such conditions is too much t o  ask 
of anyone, espec ia l ly  any American. 
7. I n  g e n e r a l  t h e  speed  of  set t lement i n  t h e  centers ,  the  heterogeneous 
population, and t h e  a r t i f i c i a l  s o c i a l  and economic. s i t u a t i o n s  of center  
l i f e  have created a new soc ie ty  with no regu la r  system of s o c i a l  con- 
t r o l s .  A s  wi th  t h e  old boomtowns of t h e  West, t he  law i s  taken i n  one's 
own hands simply f o r  t h e  lack of  any  in tegra ted  s e t  of  soc i a l  controls   
as  represented by family and community organization,  public opinion and 
folkways . 
8. The f a c t o r s  inherent  i n  the  s i t u a t i o n  a r e  d i f f e r en t  in t h e  r e s t r i c t e d  
a reas  of t h e  Vestern .Defense Command thari i n  other  areas. Tne g r ea t e r  
r e s t r i c t i o n s  imposed by t he  Western Defense Command area and the very 
h o s t i l e  a t t i t u d e  of surrounding communities in Arizona and Cal i fornia  
makes l i f e  f o r  t he  evacuees i n  these  centers more d i f f i c u l t  and unhappy.   
It i s  not  simply coincidence t h a t  t h e  only  ser ious  incidents  have occurred 
i n  cen te rs  i n  t h e  r e s t r i c t e d  area. 
Factors Related t o  Project  Administration. 
I n  con t ras t  t o  t h e  above- l i s ted  condit ions inherent  i n  t h e  s i tua -  
t ion ,  the re  a r e  others  which, being r e l a t e d  t o  p ro jec t  adminis t ra t ion ,  
can be a f fec ted  by WRA  policy. Some of t h e  po in t s  l i s t e d  here may now 
be past  h i s to ry  i n  some projects,  but  i n  others  they a r e s t i l l  more or  
l e s s  acute problems. 
1. Out-groups. A t  many projects ,  a s  th ings  were f i r s t  organized, it was 
t h e  volunteer Nisei  wi th  a good command of English who landed most of t h e  
good jobs, Latecomers and those l e s s  f l u e n t  i n  English tended t o  be l e f t  
out a s  wel l  a s  those  who regarded t h e  boasting of one's a b i l i t i e s  t o  be 
vulgar. These l a s t ,  when they found t h a t  t h e  adn in i s t r a t i ve  personnel 
accepted t he  volunteers a t  face  value and made no attempt t o  search f o r  
other l e s s  forward t a l e n t ,  became disillusioned i n  some of t he  p ro jec t  
administrators.  The excessive a t t e n t i o n  given t o  JACL, an organization 
which f o r  one reason o r  another has many-enemies, has simply corroborated 
t h i s  a t t i t ude .  
Thus, i n  one way or  another, t he r e  has grown up on most projects  
a l a r g e  "out-group", which is d i s sa t i s f i ed ,  has l i t t l e  responsibi l i ty ,  
and i s  consequently uncooperative w i t h  WRA administration ,  especia l ly  
wi th  Nisei office-holders. 
The undermining of t he  au thor i ty  of I s s e i  and of the  soc i a l  con- 
t r o l  functions of Japanese soc i e t i e s  such a s  the  Kenjinkai contributed 
t o  t h i s  uncooperative a t t i t u d e  i n  t he  f i rs t  generetion. The I s s e i  having 
l o s t  both economic and s oc i a l  predominance tend t o  be uncooperative with 
t he  administrat ion,  and some even go so  far  as t o  encourage Nisei  non- 
cooperation. 
Specia l  e f f o r t s  should be made t o  e n l i s t  members of out-groups t o  
usefu l  work, and through a recognit ion of t h e i r  a b i l i t i e s  give them a 
f ee l i ng  of r e spons ib i l i t y  f o r  the  welfare of  the  center.  The t r a d i t i o n a l  
leadership  and r e spons ib i l i t y  of o lder  men (whether I s s e i  o r  N i s e i  )  should 
a l so  be recognized. 
2. Many WRA promises t o  evacuees have, f o r  one reason o r  another, not 
been f u l f i l l e d .  Work payments have of ten  been delayed, and leave c l e a r a n c e  
slow. Sometimes people at projects  have made promises i n  these  matters  
which they have been unable t o  keep. This undermines f a i t h  in pro jec t  
admin is t ra t ion  a s  wel l  a s  i n  the  s i n c e r i t y  of t h e  federa l  government. 
3. Related t o  (1) and (2 )  a r e  a number of unhappy s i t ua t i ons  which 
have developed a s  a r e s u l t  of a changing o r  uncer ta in  employment policy, 
both a t  t h e  p ro jec t  and nat ional  l eve l .   Frequently individuals  have 
been assigned t o  jobs they f e l t  unqualif ied for ;  o thers  have had t h e i r  
spec i a l  t r a in ing  i n  one f i e l d  o r  another ignored; work payments, as 
noted above, hare not always been prompt, 
4, Growth of c a s t e  a t t i tudes .  This i s  r e l a t e d  t o  a f ac to r  inherent  i n  
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the  s i tua t ion ,  i.e., t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  WRA  adminis t ra t ive  s t a f f  i s  
"Caucasion", while t h e  evacuees a r e  "Oriental". Too often t h i s  gives 
r i s e  t o  a t t i t u d e s  of super io r i ty  on t he  p a r t  of t h e  adminis t ra t ive  
personnel. Ci t izen evacuees f e e l  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  keenly. 
5. Affronts t o  evacuee ideas  of propriety. A m o n g  o lder  Japanese it 
i s  not  considered proper t o  s l a p  one another on t h e  back. They a l s o  
look askance upon WRA s t a f f  members ac t ing  i n  too  f r i end ly  a way with 
evacuee a s s i s t an t s ,  whereby they  ca l l  one another by t h e i r  f irst  names,. 
etc.  Together with t h i s  t r ad i t i ona l ,  (and usefu l )  Japanese cu l t u r e  
pat terns  a r e  sometimes ignored -- e.g., f o r  responsible  work i n  l o c a l  
government, r espec t  f o r  age i n  Japanese soc i e ty  (placing young men in  
responsible posi t ions  on t h e  police force,  f o r  instance,  i s  not always 
a good policy).  
6.  Division of au tho r i t y  and an openly discussed disagreement among 
administrat ive personnel. This i s  always bad and under conditions  of 
center  l i f e  undermines respect  f o r  W R A .  
7. Ine f f i c i en t  use  of ag r i cu l t u r a l  machinery, of evacuee workers, etc.,  
a l so  leads  t o  d i s respec t  of t h e  administrat ive s t a f f  by evacuees who 
i n  Cal i fornia  were very careful  and e f f i c i e n t  users of both manpower 
and machines, 
Signs of Trouble. 
There are a number of symptoms of impending trouble.  When they 
appear it is well t o  look behind them f o r  motivation, It i s  a l so   well 
t o  consider t h e  consequence of any move t o  dea l  with what may appear on 
the  surface  t o  be a simple s i tua t ion .  
1. Beatings, A man may be assaulted f o r  what appears t o  be simply a 
personal grudge. Often, however, t h e  man beaten i s  looked upon as  an 
informer o r  in  some way has come t o  serve as an a t tackable  symbol of 
WRA administration, which in tu rn  symbolizes  the  forces  t h a t  caused 
evacuation, In such a s i t ua t i on  it i s  extremely unwise t o  a r r e s t  a man 
s imp ly  on suspicion .  The troubles a t  both Poston and Manzanar came out 
of j u s t  such a r r e s t s  on suspicion. 
2. The growth of young men's gangs. These a r e  probably t h e  r e s u l t  of 
conditions inherent  i n  c e n t e r  l i f e .  Every e f f o r t  should be made t o  
t u r n  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  of such groups t o  const ruct ive  ends i n  order t o  
counteract a natural tendency f o r  them t o  indulge i n  anti-administration
a c t i v i t i e s .  
3. Labor t roubles .  I f  conditions a r e  r i p e  f o r  it, t h e  f i r i n g  of a 
s i n g l e  man may r e s u l t  i n  a general  s t r i ke .  Care should be taken i n  
times of unrest t o  be sure  t o  dismiss employees  only f o r  a very good 
cause. In f a c t ,  empolyment  po l ic ies  can be very important - making 
f o r  t h e  smooth running of a project ,  o r  being a constant  source of 
trouble. The comments on cas te  a t t i t u d e s  apply here. 
4. Mess h a l l  t roubles.  These a r e  more l i k e l y  t o  be due t o  personal  
squabbles than a r e  employment t roubles ,  but  if not  ca r e fu l l y  handled 
they can a l so  become a - f o c a l  point  f o r  a large-scale demonstration. 
The causes of events such a s  those l i s t e d  above should be dis-  
cussed and analyzed with a number of evacuees of d i f f e r e n t  groups, 
e.g., anti-JACL Nisei a s  wel l  a s  JACL members, I s s e i  without a s  wel l  a s  
those  with s t r a t e g i c  jobs (e.g., chefs o r  foremen), men from spec i a l  
backgrounds such a s  fishermen, farmers, r e t a i l e r s .  Representatives of 
such s o c i a l  groups can be very helpful  in  ge t t i ng  a t  t he  bas ic  causes 
of f r u s t r a t i o n  and d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  among center  res idents .  The very 
discuss ion of some of t h e i r  problems will provide a means of re leas ing  
pent-up grudges and so help i n  c rea t ing  a more cooperative a t t i t ude .  
Attention should a l s o  be paid t o  any o ther  re levant  f ac to r s  t h a t  
might create  or  contr ibute  toward an incident :  t h e  bui lding of a 
barbed wire fence, t h e  v i s i t s  of FBI men, long delay i n  providing some 
promised i tem t o  t he  res iden ts .  
A t  present t h e  s i n c e r i t y  of t he  government, a s  represented by WRA, 
i s  se r ious ly  questioned by many evacuees. The things t h a t  were done t o  
them i n  California,  and t h e  e f f ec t s  of assembly center  l i f e ,  w i l l  not 
be forgot ten f o r  many years t o  come. For t h i s  reason it i s  unwise t o  
assume t h a t  just because WRA i s  s incere  i n  i t s  e f f o r t s  t o  solve the  
problems created by e v a c u a t i o n  t h a t  t he  evacuees should accept protes- 
t a t i o n s  of s i n c e r i t y  a t  f a ce  value. There i s ,  however, a con t inu i ty  
of d i r ec t i on  i n  WRA po l icy  which it is  worth-bringing out  from time t o  
time: a direction away from r e s t r i c t i o n  and l o s s  of c i v i l  r i g h t s  
towards a full r e s t o r a t i on  of c i v i l  r i g h t s  and r a c i a l  democracy. The 
f a c t s  of h i s to ry  show a continuous trend i n  t h i s  d i rec t ion .  
(1) The inauguration of t h e  leave policy. 
(2)  T h e  reopening  of t h e  Army t o  Japanese Americans 
as soldiers. 
( 3 )  The removal  of t h e  r e s t r i c t e d  area boandary 60 
miles west t o  leave Poston and G i l a  outs ide  t h e  
area. 
